


How to wrap it up – A formally verified proposal for the use of authenticated wrapping in PKCS#11

Alexander Dax, Robert Künnemann, Sven Tangermann and Michael Backes











PKCS#11 - logical attacks





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


 \Rightarrow need to authenticate attributes!

PKCS#11 - state of key-wrapping




- PKCS#11v2.40 introduces GCM and CCM. The end..?
- .. no, two-pad attack:




- PKCS#11v3.00 in drafting stage:
 - Can we fix this for GCM and CCM?
 - Is SIV (synthetic IV) an alternative?
 - Is authenticated key-wrapping an improvement?

Research goals









- provably secure: key-secrecy and handle-integrity
- more functionality than other provable secure policies, where either
 - one cannot backup wrapping keys
 - keys have less attributes after unwrapping, they "degrade"
- downside: static hierarchy

Policy - relation to PKCS#11 v3.00



- PKCS#11v2.40 added GCM,CCM, but insecurely
- v3.00 in draft:
 - C_Encrypt and C_Wrap key cannot output IV (historically user supplied)
 - new interface C_EncryptMessage specifically for AEAD
 - keep cryptographic state for multiple messages with possibly different IVs, additional data
 - application can request internal IV generation, pointer to IV is thus either input or out parameter
 - need same convention for wrap (not even a new interface!)
 - FIPS basically requires internal IV-generation for GCM

Symbolic modelling



(see paper)



Model: Authenticated encryption

- IV generation is part of protocol, hence IV needs to be exposed
- equational theory:

 $\begin{aligned} \mathsf{sdec}(k, iv, h, \mathsf{senc}(k, iv, h, m)) &= m \\ \mathsf{sdecSuc}(k, iv, h, \mathsf{senc}(k, iv, h, m)) &= \mathsf{true}() \\ \mathsf{getHeader}(\mathsf{senc}(k, iv, h, m)) &= h \\ \mathsf{getIV}(\mathsf{senc}(k, iv, h, m)) &= iv \end{aligned}$

- sound for GCM, CCM, SIV?
- DAE-N security: $A^{O_k^{Enc}(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot),O_k^{Dec}(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)} \approx A^{\$(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot),\bot(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)}$ as long as A does not reuse IVs or query previous encryptions.
- GCM and CCM are AEAD secure implies DAE-N security.

Deduction soundness



- Intuition: computational adversary can only deduce information if the symbolic adversary can, too.
- Pro: composability, thus lots of PKCS#11 functionality covered
- Contra: covers only secrecy, not integrity. necessary, but not sufficient
- Approach:
 - assume injective function mapping terms to IVs (e.g., concat)
 - as IVs have fixed length, domain needs to be finite
 - impose use of this function at IV position
 - protocol condition: uniqueness of terms given to this function

Deduction soundness - proof obligations



keys only at key position or within wrapping

.. no dynamic corruption :(

V no key-cycles


 each term at IV position is unique

🖛 to check

What about SIV mode?



- if we prepend IV to header, SIV is DAE-N secure
- but if protocol always sets h:=ε, construction vanishes
- we obtain model for SIV mode without need for deduction soundness result by writing senc(k,<iv,h>,ε,m) in place of senc(k,iv,h,m)
- PKCS#11v3.00 draft: interface spec would be fine, but SIV not part of "current mechanisms"



Verification



- IV uniqueness
- key-integrity: all keys are created on some device
- key-secrecy: no key can ever leak
- handle-integrity: keys retain the handle (and level) they were created with
- total verification time: 3mins (GCM/CCM), 3.5 min (SIV)
- three helping lemmas

Wrap-up & Take-away



