



# CISPA


HELMHOLTZ CENTER FOR  
INFORMATION SECURITY

# Causality & Control Flow


Robert Künnemann, Deepak Garg, Michael Backes

# Pearl's structured equations model

- Random variables: exogenous (outside model), endogenous




- Intervention: express what-if test






- $\vec{X}=\vec{x}$  what-if cause of  $Y=y$  in context  $\vec{u}$  iff
  - $\vec{u} \models \vec{X}=\vec{x} \wedge Y=y$
  - $\vec{u} \models [\vec{X} \leftarrow \vec{x}'] Y \neq y$
  - $\vec{X}$  minimal

# Preemption


late preemption



early preemption




- Where should it be represented
  - equations: ... no
  - context: .. no
  - control-flow variables



- Intervention only on data-flow
  - causes can only be about data-flow
  - events can change, but temporal relations remain fixed
- Key-question: how does counterfactual control-flow relate to actual control-flow?

- Where should it be represented

- equations: ... no
- context: .. no
- control-flow variables




- Intervention only on data-flow

- causes can only be about data-flow
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- Key-question: how does counterfactual control-flow relate to actual control-flow?


- Where should it be represented



```
if T1=S or T1=B
then
  BS=1
else if T2=S or T2=B
then
  BS=1
else
  if T3=S or T3=B
  then
    BS=1
  else
    BS=0
```

- Key-question: how does counterfactual control-flow relate to actual control-flow?


- Where should it be represented
  - equations: ... no
  - context: .. no
  - control-flow variables



- Intervention only on data-flow
  - events can change,  
but temporal relations remain fixed
  - causes can only concern data-flow variable
- Key-question: how does counterfactual control-flow relate to actual control-flow?

# Digression: Review Pearl/Halpern definition

- $\vec{X}=\vec{X}$  cause for  $Y=y$  iff
  - AC1, AC3 as before
  - AC2:  $\exists \vec{W}, \vec{w}, \vec{x}. \vec{u} \models \vec{W}=\vec{w} \wedge [\vec{X} \leftarrow \vec{x}', \vec{W} \leftarrow \vec{w}] Y \neq y$



- generalisation of what-if cause ( $\vec{W}$  empty)
- alternative reading: remove parts of cause that fix to actual values
- observation 1: contingencies concern control-flow in almost all examples
- observation 2: if they include control-flow, they can give unintuitive results
- consequence: restrict  $\vec{W}$  to control-flow,  $\vec{X}$  to data-flow variables

# Back to key-question:

CFN2: For  $\vec{C}$  the actual control flow (i.e., the ctl-flow variables set to 1),  
there is  $\vec{X}'$  s.t.  $\vec{u}_F[(V_{\text{ctl}} \setminus C) \leftarrow \vec{0}, \vec{X} \leftarrow \vec{X}'] Y \neq y$

	proposal	idea	drawback
Freedom in choosing ctl-flow	Datta et.al. / Beckers	interventions need to preserve ctl-flow	coming about of event may be important
	our proposal	may interrupt, but never stray from path	?
	Lewis' what-if	arbitrary, but induced by data-flow	different course of events can mask preemption
	Halpern'15	pick & choose	can pick inconsistent ctl-flow, e.g., Careful poisoning (Weslake)

- Benchmarked with 34 Examples from Halpern'15 and Weslake'15 (no cherry-picking!)
- Available at <https://github.com/rkunnema/causation-benchmark> (Please extend!)
- **still not conclusive:**
  - flexibility in modelling
  - modelling principles, but very generic domain
- **how to get to conclusion?** translations, e.g., PDG to causal models

	Definition 4	Definition 7	Definition 6
Forest fire, Ex. 1 — disjunctive (overdet.) [9, p. 278] — disjunctive, ext. [11, Ex. 3.7]	(A, B, FF) (B, O), (S, O) (MD, L, C, FF), (MD, B, C, FF), (L, A, C, FF)	(A), (B), (FF) (B, S), (O) (MD), (L), (C), (FF)	(A, B, FF) (B, O), (S, O) (MD, L, FF)
Late preemption, Ex. 4	(T1, BS1, BS), (T2, BS1, BS2, BS)	(T1), (BS1), (BS)	(T1, BS)
Early preemption [17, p. 526] — (ctl), Ex. 5 <sup>a</sup>	(A, D1, D2), (B, P, D2) (A, S, D), (B, P, S, S, PE, NS, D)	(A), (D1), (D2) (A), (S, T), (D)	(A, D2) (A, D)
Bogus prevention [15] — ad-hoc [13, p. 29] — (ctl), Ex. 6  — (ctl, reversed) <sup>b</sup>	(P, S), (A, S) (P, S), (A, S, PN) (P, S, NP, S), (A, S, P, NP, S, N), (P, D, NP, S), (A, D, NP, S, PN, S)	(P, A), (S) (P, S) (P), (S), (NP, S)  (P), (D), (NP, S)	(P, S), (A, S) (P, S) (P, S)  (P, D)
Careful Poisoning [23, Ex. 11] — (ctl) <sup>c</sup>	(A, D), (P, D) (A, NA, P, D), (NA, A, P, P, D)	(A), (D) (A), (NA), (P), (D)	(A, D), (P, D) (D)
Train [12, Ex. 4] — [8] — (ctl) <sup>d</sup>	(F, RB, A), (LB, RB, A) (F, RT, A) (F, R, A), (L, R, A)	(F, LB), (RB), (A) (F), (RT), (A) (F), (R), (A)	(F, RB, A), (LB, RB, A) (F, A) (F, A)
Prisoner [18] Backup [23, Ex. 1] — (ctl) [23, Ex. 1]	(C, D) (T, V), (S, V) (T, V, T), (S, V, T, NT, S)	(C), (D) (T), (V) (T), (V), (T)	(C, D) (T, V), (S, V) (T, V)
Command [23, Ex. 8]	(M, C)	(M), (C)	(M, C)
Agreement, Ex. 7 BoS, Ex. 8	(A, B, R, O) (P1, P2, C, T)	(A), (B), (R), (O) (N), (P1), (P2), (C), (T)	(A, B, O) (P1, P2, T)
Switch [23, p. 16] Combination Lamp [23, p. 19] Shock [23, p. 17] Push A [23, p. 26]	(S, L2, I), (L1, L2, I) (B, C, L) (B, C, C1) (P, B, H, D), (P, T, H, D)	(S), (L2), (I) (B), (C), (L) (A), (B), (C), (C1) (P), (B, T), (H), (D)	(S, L2, I), (L1, L2, I) (B, C, L) (B, C) (P, B, H, D), (P, T, H, D)
— (ctl) <sup>e</sup> Push B [23, p. 26] Fancy Lamp [23, p. 31]	(P, T, P, H, D) (P, T, H, D) (A, N3, L), (B, NI, L)	(P), (T), (P), (H), (D) (P), (T), (H), (D) (A, B), (A, NI), (B, N3), (NI, N3), (L)	(P, T, H, D) (P, T, H, D) (A, N3, L), (B, NI, L)
Vote [11, Ex. 4.1] Ranch [11, Ex. 3.7] Vote 5:2 <sup>f</sup>	(V1, M, P), (V2, M, P) (A1, A2, M1, O) (V1, V2, V3, V4, O), (V1, V2, V3, V5, O), (V1, V2, V4, V5, O), (V1, V3, V4, V5, O), (V2, V3, V4, V5, O)	(M), (P) (A1), (A2), (M1), (O) (V1, V2), (V1, V3), (V1, V4), (V1, V5), (V2, V3), (V2, V4), (V2, V5), (V3, V4), (V3, V5), (V4, V5), (O)	(V1, M, P), (V2, M, P) (A1, A2) (V1, V2, V3, V4), (V1, V2, V3, V5), (V1, V2, V4, V5), (V1, V3, V4, V5), (V2, V3, V4, V5)
Pollution, k = 80 [11, Ex. 3.11] Pollution, k = 50 [11, Ex. 3.11] Pollution, k = 120 [11, Ex. 3.11]	(A, D) (A, D), (B, D) (A, B, D)	(A), (D) (A, B), (D) (A), (B), (D)	(A, D) (A, D), (B, D) (A, B, D)

- causality definitions struggle with preemption
- proposal: explicit modelling of control-flow
  - modelling principles
  - restriction on intervention
  - definition: control-flow preserving causation
- benefits:
  - model hard examples without secondary notions like normality
  - understand existing causality definitions better<sup>1</sup>

Thank you! Questions?